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Radical Plural Democracy
A New Theory For the Left?
Susan Hekman
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Dr. Hekman's article shows the
current state of Marxism in
relation to Postmodernism and highlights
the need to re-think the
left.
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To say that marxism is
in crisis in the last
decade of the twentieth century
is an understatement. In both
theory and practice marxism has
been buffeted from all sides
since mid-century. The demise of
marxist-identified political regimes in Russia
and Eastern Europe focused world
attention on the political, social
and economic failures of these
governments. Although marxist intellectuals could,
and, indeed, did, vigorously protest
that these regimes did not
represent the political expression of
marxist principles, their nominal association
with marxism discredited it in
the eyes of the world.
Fukuyama's (1992) claim that the
demise of marxism and the
triumph of liberal democracy heralds
the "end of history" represents
an extreme interpretation of this
set of events. But it
voices a sentiment that is
widespread in the 90's: that
liberal democracy has proven its
superiority over its long-time rival. On the intellectual scene marxism
has been similarly discredited. Marxist
theory has been unable to
accommodate three significant intellectual movements
in the last decades of
the twentieth century: postmodernism/poststructuralism,
theoretical articulations of the "new
social movements" such as feminism,
ecology and identity politics, and
a revitalized theory of liberal
democracy. The postmodern/poststructuralist attack
on metanarratives, totalizing theories that
purport to explain the whole
of social reality, is equally
applicable to marxism and traditional
liberalism. But this critique has
been focused on the left
because many postmodern/poststructuralist theorists
are former marxists; liberalism is
rarely deemed worthy of their
attention. The upshot of the
critique, thus, has not been
so much to question the
viability of any foundationalist politics,
but, rather, specifically to problematize
marxist/leftist
politics. The rise of "new social
movements" has dealt an equally
crippling blow. Feminists, ecologists, proponents
of identity politics rooted in
race, ethnicity, or sexuality have
failed to find a theoretical
home in marxism; they have
instead articulated an independent theoretical
position. The rise of these
movements and their apparent incompatibility
with marxism has revealed an
important lacuna in marxist theory.
Despite its sensitivity to the
role of social and material
conditions in constructing social reality,
traditional marxism is silent on
an issue that dominates contemporary
theory: the cultural construction of
race, gender, ethnicity and sexuality.
Traditional marxist theory focuses on
a single factor: material/economic
conditions. It is the clash
of classes defined by the
ownership of the means of
production that drives marxist theory;
there is no room for
differences of gender, class, race
and ethnicity. This has created
a peculiar dilemma for contemporary
marxists. The new social movements
identify themselves as oppositional, resistance
movements; they thus fall under
the traditional purview of the
left. Yet marxist theory cannot
accommodate these movements without violating
its basic tenets. The most
that can be accomplished is
an uneasy theoretical and practical
accommodation. The third factor that has
discredited contemporary marxism is the
rebirth of liberal democratic theory
and practice. Marx's disdain for
bourgeois liberalism characterizes twentieth century
marxist theory as well. Like
their predecessors, twentieth century marxists
have assumed that liberalism is
not worthy of their attention
because it is a passing
phenomenon; it will wither away
with the inevitable demise of
capitalism. The current revitalization of
liberal democratic theory has thus
proved to be something of
an embarrassment. Far from withering
on the theoretical or political
vine, liberal democracy has proved
to be a dynamic force
on the contemporary intellectual
scene.The dilemma facing contemporary marxism
thus, is daunting. It is
tempting to argue that leftist
intellectuals should simply abandon marxism
and move on to a
more promising theoretical location. This
is an unattractive option for
a number of reasons. First,
the left has too much
invested in marxism to abandon
it entirely. Although the theme
of liberation is not unique
to marxism, its articulation in
marxism has proved to be
particularly powerful. marxism's call for
liberation has ignited the political
passions of millions across the
world and inspired oppositional intellectuals
for over a century. No
other resistance movement in modern
history has exhibited such strength;
it is a powerful resource
for leftist theory and politics.
Second, despite their departure from
marxist principles, contemporary oppositional movements
such as feminism and identity
politics grew out of marxist
politics and are fueled by
a marxist-inspired concept of liberation.
Many of their proponents are
disaffected marxists who have strayed
from the fold. Third, no
obvious alternative to marxism is
emerging on the political left.
Postmodernism is frequently accused of
being a-political, even nihilistic. At
the very least, the movement
has no obvious political agenda.
The new social movements, although
overtly political, fail to offer
a comprehensive political theory; they
focus on the aspect of
political life that defines their
movement without developing a general
social/political position. In the
60's and 70's it appeared
that the second generation critical
theory of Jurgen Habermas would
fill the gap in leftist
theory. But this promise has
not been realized. Habermas's work
has become too closely identified
with analytic philosophy, an approach
with decidedly conservative implications. His
increasingly arcane theories have failed
to inspire a revitalized leftist
politics.In the last decade, however,
a new and potentially significant
theory has appeared on the
left intellectual scene: radical plural
democracy.
1
It appears to have
exactly what the contemporary left
needs: it incorporates many of
the insights of postmodern and
poststructuralist approaches; it offers a
theoretical explanation of the new
social movements; it even embraces
some of the contributions of
recent theories of liberal democracy.
Significantly, it defines this effort
as a continuation of the
marxist heritage and, specifically, its
liberatory theme. The purpose of
this essay is to assess
this new theory of the
left. By tracing the evolution
of the approach, I will
question whether it represents a
viable theoretical and political direction
for leftist
politics."Left-wing thought today stands
at a crossroads. The 'evident
truths' of the past...have
been seriously challenged by an
avalanche of historical mutations which
have riven the ground on
which those truths were constituted."
This is the opening sentence
of the first comprehensive statement
of radical plural democracy: Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
(1985).
2
In the first few pages of the book they explain
why they see marxist theory
to be at a crossroads.
In recent years, they claim,
"positive new phenomena" have emerged that
demand theoretical reconsideration: new feminism,
protest movements of ethnic, national
and sexual minorities, the ecology
movement. These phenomena, they assert,
cannot be dealt with in
the context of the presuppositions
that frame marxist theory: universal
subjects and a singular definition
of history. The basic presuppositions
that frame radical plural democracy
are prefigured in this initial
statement. The most fundamental is
that the left is in
crisis; marxism as usual cannot
continue. Another is the recognition
of the significance of the
new social movements that have
arisen in recent decades. Radical
plural democracy recognizes that unless
the left can accommodate these
movements it will lose what
little viability it still possesses.
Finally, radical plural democracy assumes
a central tenet of postmodernism:
the death of the modernist
subject. The authors tacitly acknowledge
the centrality of this subject
to marxist theory and accept
that it is no longer
a viable basis for
theorizing.A fundamental tension characterizes the
argument of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
On one hand Laclau
and Mouffe remain tied to
the theoretical discourse of marxism.
Over half of the book
consists of an extended analysis,
which, following Foucault, they call
a genealogy, of the concept
of hegemony in marxist theory.
They offer detailed discussions of
the thought of Luxembourg, Kautsky,
Bernstein, Sorel and Gramsci. They
define their goal as "operating
deconstructively within marxist categories." To
accomplish this they employ the
discourses of classical marxism, abandoning
some elements of those discourses,
transforming others, with the aim
of recovering what they define
as the plurality of early
marxism. But this effort is
uneasily balanced with a second
tendency: the movement into "post-marxist
terrain." Laclau and Mouffe claim
that although hegemony is a
marxist concept, it introduces a
logic of the social that
is incompatible with marxist categories.
They thus conclude that it
is necessary to move beyond
marxism, that marxism is only
one of the traditions through
which it is possible to
formulate the new conception of
politics that they are seeking
-a "radical, libertarian and plural
democracy" (Laclau and Mouffe,
3-4). The tension between these two
tendencies in their first book
sets the stage for the
theoretical and practical difficulties the
approach will encounter as it
develops. The second tendency has
come to dominate the emerging
theory. The second half of
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
establishes the two central themes of
radical plural democracy. The first
is the adoption of the
principal elements of postmodernism: the
critique of metanarratives and the
rejection of the transcendental subject.
The authors define hegemony as
a relational category, even suggesting
that it is a transitional
concept that marks the end
of essentialist discourse. The concept
of hegemony, they claim, reveals
the "unfixity" of social relations:
there are no privileged points,
no fixed subject positions (87-8).
"Subject positions" replaces "the subject"
in their discussions. These subject
positions, furthermore, are defined as
discursive, partaking of the open
character of all discourse (115).
This move takes the authors
beyond the traditional terrain of
marxism. It entails that there
is no repression per se,
but only repression as it
is defined in a discursive
relation (154). It also entails
"that the definition of the
workers' struggle" need not be
opposed to that of women
and ethnic minorities (167). Once
the notion of a universal
working class is abandoned, this
opposition disappears. Significantly, the notion
of a privileged standpoint also
disappears. On the author's reading
no one has a prerogative
on truth; there are only
discourses that articulate
resistance.Perhaps the most startling move
in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,
however, is the second theme
presented in the latter half
of the book: the incorporation
of liberal democratic theory. After
a discussion of Hayek, Nozick
and Brzezinski, the authors argue:
"It would be an error
to underestimate the importance of
these attempts to redefine notions
such as 'liberty,' 'equality,' 'justice,'
and 'democracy.'" The "traditional dogmatism
of the Left," they assert,
results in a narrow range
of vision. The left has
ignored problems at the center
of political philosophy as well
as "the whole vast field
of culture and the definition
of reality built on the
basis of it." Worse, these
fields have been "left free
for the initiative of the
right" (174). To counter these
tendencies Laclau and Mouffe urge
the left not to reject
liberal democracy, but to "deepen
and expand it in the
direction of a radical and
plural democracy" (176). They even
go so far as to
assert that the ethical principle
of the liberty of the
individual is particularly valid today
(184).The definition of radical plural
democracy that Laclau and Mouffe
advance in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
can be seen as
a kind of challenge to
the left. It outlines a
way to incorporate both postmodernism
and liberal democracy into a
leftist, quasi-marxist politics. One of
the principal goals of this
politics is to accommodate the
new social movements that marxism
had previously excluded. But even
at this early stage the
potential problems inherent in their
enterprise are evident. Laclau and
Mouffe reject several of the
central tenets of marxism while
nonetheless claiming a marxist inspiration.
The privileged standpoint of the
proletariat, determination by material conditions,
and the centrality of class
conflict are all jettisoned. They
further incorporate a concept that
has been the object of
marxist critique since its inception:
the liberal notion of individual
rights. Finally, they embrace a
position, postmodernism, that denies the
legitimacy of both the marxist
and liberal projects. Laclau and
Mouffe are aware of these
tensions from the outset and
seek to resolve them in
subsequent work. But whether such
a resolution is even possible
is surely in
question.In the years following the
publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,
Laclau and Mouffe have
expanded the outline of radical
plural democracy they advanced in
the book, defending it against
its critics on the left.
Their defensive strategy follows a
clear pattern: a movement away
from a marxist modernism and
toward a postmodern eclecticism that
embraces liberal political philosophy. Thus
in Andrew Ross's Universal Abandon?
Mouffe declares that radical plural
democracy
The development of radical plural democracy follows the two themes
introduced in the second half
of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
Mouffe declares that only postmodernism
can allow us to understand
the complexity of contemporary social
movements, particularly the multiplicity of
subjects (34).
She focuses on
one of the central themes
of postmodernism, the redefinition of
the subject, and ties her
discussion to a pervasive topic
of contemporary social theory: difference.
Radical plural democracy, Mouffe declares,
demands the recognition of difference,
particularly the recognition of different
subject positions (35-6).
3
Laclau takes the accommodation with postmodernism
even further. In his essay
in Ross's book he asserts
that the genealogy of marxism
coincides with the postmodern deconstruction
of the myth of origins.
Abandoning this myth, he claims,
leads not to nihilism but
to a proliferation of discursive
interventions (76-9).Mouffe also significantly expands the
second theme: the incorporation of
liberal democracy. The task of
radical democracy, she claims, is
to deepen the democratic project
of modernity without incorporating the
abstract universalism of the Enlightenment
(1988:44). Although Laclau and
Mouffe had advanced this theme
in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,
Mouffe now develops it significantly,
moving more firmly into liberal
terrain. She argues that socialist
goals can only be achieved
within a liberal democratic framework
and that a strong alliance
with the ethico-political principles of
modern democracy is necessary to
promote the project of radical
and plural democracy ("Radical Democracy
or Liberal Democracy", 57-61). Taking
an even more daring step,
she asserts that radical democracy's
emphasis on tradition, particularity, and
difference converges with some aspects
of conservative thinking ("Radical Democracy:
modern or postmodern", 38). She
introduces the Aristotelian concept of
"phronesis" to buttress her thesis.
For Aristotle phronesis is ethical
knowledge that is dependent on
cultural and historical conditions current
in the community, practical reason
specific to the study of
human
praxis (Ibid., 36).Given the radical implications of
Laclau and Mouffe's position, it
is curious that there has
been a relatively mild reaction
on the left to radical
plural democracy. This in itself
is indicative. Few on the
left are willing to defend
traditional marxism at this juncture
and, specifically, to claim legitimacy
for the privileged standpoint that
Laclau and Mouffe are abandoning.
It is also indicative that
the critiques that have appeared
attack radical plural democracy from
opposite theoretical directions. On one
hand, for example, Aronowitz claims
that radical plural democracy is
not truly antifoundational but must
necessarily presuppose an ethical a
priori ("Postmodernism...", 52). And, from
an opposite perspective, Bove, discussing
a position that also abandons
the totality of marxism, claims
that this move leads to
"a typical and dangerous form
of American pluralism"
(18).Laclau and Mouffe define radical
plural democracy as marxism by
"other means," which, for them,
include postmodernism, the new social
movements, and a version of
liberal democracy. In many ways
the definition of radical plural
democracy parallels another theoretical movement
in the late 1980's and
early 1990's: the articulation of
a "postmodern politics." A debate
has raged in a variety
of academic disciplines over whether
it is even possible to
define a postmodern politics. Many
critics of postmodernism claim that
the term is an oxymoron
because postmodernism is at best
nihilistic and a-political and, at
worst, entails political conservatism. Despite,
or perhaps because of these
criticisms, advocates of postmodernism have
attempted to define a postmodern
politics of resistance. And what
better way to do so
than to argue for a
link between postmodernism and marxism?
Michael Ryan makes just such
a case in Marxism and Deconstruction.
here are many similarities
between Ryan's project and that
of Laclau and Mouffe. Ryan
defines the aim of his
book as developing a new
form of analysis that is
both marxist and deconstructionist (Marxism,
xv). He argues that deconstructive
philosophy has positive implications for
marxism both theoretically and politically:
it jettisons the metaphysical elements
of marxism and it provides
a theoretical basis for antimetaphysical
tendencies in marxism (Ibid., 1).
Like Laclau and Mouffe, Ryan
wants to develop a politics
that can accommodate the new
social movements, what he calls
"the Left's Right" (Ibid., 215).
And, also like them, he
turns to postmodernism to define
this politics. Ryan parts company
with Laclau and Mouffe, however,
on the issue of liberalism.
In Marxism and Deconstruction
he argues strenuously against the "liberal
implications" of Derrida's philosophy, citing
the "danger" of a conservative
or even reactionary interpretation of
deconstruction (Ibid, 193). In a
later book, Politics and Culture,
he elaborates this theme by
claiming that deconstruction is not
compatible with liberalism, but, rather,
reveals its internal
contradictions. There is, at this point,
a huge literature on "postmodern
politics."
4
I cite Ryan's work in this context because
he identifies his postmodern politics
as marxist. Others, most notably
Richard Rorty, ground their postmodern
politics in liberalism. Despite some
affinities, however, postmodern politics and
radical plural democracy are not
identical. The political implications of
postmodernism are not, Ryan's arguments
notwithstanding, necessarily leftist. Although elements
of postmodernism can be used
to formulate a left politics,
it does not entail such
a politics. Radical plural democracy,
on the other hand, is
leftist/marxist first and postmodern
only secondarily. This is an
important distinction. Postmodernism can provide
tools and insights for the
construction of a left politics,
but it cannot supply the
foundation for that politics.
In the introduction to his edited
book on postmodern politics, aptly
titled Universal Abandon?,
Andrew Ross puts this very well. Postmodern
politics, he asserts, has different
origins than those that produce
leftist politics; it produces a
politics of difference that liberates
voices of color, gender and
sexual orientation from the margins
(Ross, xvi).
5
Such a politics has no necessary direction
or orientation; it is just
as undefined as postmodernism
itself.In 1992 Chantal Mouffe edited
Dimensions of Radical Democracy.
The essays in this volume expand
and to a certain extent
redefine the theory of radical
plural democracy that she and
Laclau advanced seven years earlier.
The volume is prefaced by
a statement of editorial policy
for a new series of
books edited by Laclau and
Mouffe under the title Phronesis.
This statement is the most
concise definition of radical plural
democracy as the authors conceive it
today:
They then go on to describe two possible solutions to
this crisis: a return to
rationalism and universalism or a
rejection of essentialism. After identifying
the second option as "a
point of convergence of the
most important trends in contemporary
theory" they
conclude:
Notice what has happened to the definition of radical plural
democracy in the years since
1985. References to marxism have
been entirely deleted; postmodernism is
linked to the new social
movements with the argument that
it offers the only possible
explanation of these phenomena; and
democracy is appropriated without reference
to its association with liberalism.
Mouffe's two articles in the
volume expand on these themes.
In "Democratic Politics Today" she
makes the sweeping statement that
those who refuse to see
liberal democratic capitalism as the
end of history have only
one option: radical democracy. The
problem, she declares, is not
defining the ideals of democracy,
but realizing them. Radical and
plural democracy forces liberal democratic
societies to be accountable to
their ideals. Mouffe's goal is
to separate liberal democracy from
capitalism and liberal individualism. The
key question, she asserts, is
how a maximum of pluralism
can be preserved without destroying
community (Mouffe, "Democratic Politics...",
1-3).For Mouffe the solution to
this theoretical challenge lies in
a redefinition of citizenship. She
discusses the concept of citizenship
under five headings: radical democracy,
community, social justice, identity, and
pluralism. Throughout, her aim is
to distinguish radical plural democracy
from traditional liberalism, the contemporary
communitarians, and earlier forms of
pluralism (Ibid., 4-12). But there
is a lacuna in Mouffe's
presentation that problematizes the position
that she is now adopting:
the alternative she is proposing
is ill-defined, particularly in political
terms. Radical plural democracy, she
declares, postulates the impossibility of
a final realization of democracy
because of the irresolvable tension
between equality and liberty. For
Mouffe modern democratic political community
is "a discursive surface of
inscriptions." Thus "the experience of
a radical and plural democracy
can only consist in the
recognition of the multiplicity of
social logics" (Ibid., 14). Further
explanation of the parameters of
this politics, however, is not
forthcoming.Mouffe's conclusion to the volume,
"Democratic Citizenship and the Political
Community," seeks to articulate a
new definition of citizenship that
is appropriate to radical plural
democracy. She situates her argument
in the context of the
liberalism/communitarianism debate, asserting that
we should combine the best
aspects of each position. Several
themes dominate her discussion. The
first is a recognition of
moral pluralism, multiple definitions of "
the good" within political life.
The second is a postmodern
definition of subjectivity. The subject,
she declares, is "the articulation
of an ensemble of subject
positions, constructed within specific discourses
and always precariously sutured at
the intersection of those subject
positions" ("Democratic Citizenship...", 237). The
common political identity that Mouffe
is striving for, thus, is
"a collective identification with a
radical democratic interpretation of the
principles of the liberal-democratic regime:
liberty and equality" (Ibid.,
236)That Mouffe's position in 1992
represents a significant move away
from traditional left/marxist politics
and toward traditional liberalism should
be evident from the summary
of these articles. The other
contributors to the volume provide
further evidence of radical plural
democracy's move toward liberalism. None
are marxists or even quasi-marxists;
several discuss the liberal concept
of pluralism at length; and
two, Walzer and Wolin, are
well-known anti-marxist left liberals. Although
each of the authors tries
to distinguish her or his
position from traditional liberalism, these
distinctions are largely unsuccessful. Walzer,
for example, wants to replace
liberal individualism with "critical associationalism"
(105). McClure wants to define
a "post-marxist pluralism" that supersedes
liberal pluralism. D'Entreves casts the
radical plural democratic net even
further by arguing for the
inclusion of Hannah Arendt's concept
of citizenship. And Sheldon Wolin,
in the concluding essay of
the volume, appropriately titled "What
Revolutionary Action Means Today," summarizes
this move to the right
by arguing that "Democrats need
a new conception of revolution.
Its text should be John
Locke, not Karl Marx"
(249).In her 1993 collection,
The Return of the Political,
Mouffe moves even further into liberal
terrain. Although there is little
that is new in this
volume all but one of
the papers was previously published
or delivered it documents Mouffe's
increasing interest in liberal political
theory. Several essays in the
volume delve into the intricacies
of contemporary liberal debates; Rawls,
Larmore, Galston, Raz and others
are discussed at length. Although
Mouffe also argues that socialism
can be "useful" in the
contemporary attempt to refashion democratic
theory and includes a discussion
of Bobbio's work, her emphasis
has shifted even more decisively
toward liberalism and away from
socialism. Mouffe's commentary on the
liberalism debate is organized around
her theme of pluralism. She
asserts that many contemporary liberals
advocate a position that fosters
homogeneity and denies plurality. Against
this she repeatedly argues that
although we must create wide
consensus around democratic values, the
means to accomplish this goal
is multiplying discourses and practices
"that produce 'democratic subject positions'"
(The Returnof the Political,
151).As this passage indicates, although
Mouffe may be abandoning socialism,
she is not abandoning postmodernism.
Mouffe's restructuring of liberalism has
a decidedly postmodern ring. Her
thesis is that the liberal
tradition is diverse and complex;
it is linked to Enlightenment
rationalism, economic liberalism, and political
liberalism as well as philosophical
discourses on man, rationality and
morality (Ibid., 42). Mouffe wants
to discard all the elements
of this heritage that are
linked to modernism, to define
a liberalism that is not
universalist, rationalist or individualist. The
liberalism she advocates is, instead,
one in which rationality, individuality
and universality are not rejected,
but defined as plural, discursively
constituted, and entangled with power
relations (Ibid., 7). The focus
of her restructuring is, once
again, the subject. She strives
to define a "non-individualistic conception
of the individual" (Ibid., 100),
an individual conceived as "the
intersection of a multiplicity of
identifications and collective identities that
constantly subvert each other" (Ibid.,
97).It is tempting to conclude
from this that, after first
fashioning a marxism that violates
the epistemological assumptions of marx,
Mouffe is now articulating a
liberalism that would be anathema
to most liberals and, furthermore,
verges on incoherence. What, exactly,
are we to make of
a "non- individualistic conception of
the individual," not to mention
a "plural" definition of universality?
Not only are these conceptions
confused, but it is hard
to imagine a liberalism that
can accommodate them. It is
even harder to imagine a
liberalism that can accommodate a
conception of the subject as
a multiplicity of intersecting identities. Mouffe's movement into liberal terrain
is motivated by her desire
to bring all the major
contemporary theoretical and political movements
under her theoretical umbrella. But
in attempting to assess the
success of radical plural democracy
it is necessary to ask
whether her strategy of inclusion
works in all cases. The
confusing and contradictory nature of
her refashioning of liberalism suggests
that it is unsuccessful in
this instance. But I would
nevertheless like to argue that
the strategy does work in
the case of postmodernism. Several
contemporary theorists, most notably Coward
and Ellis, have suggested that
Marx's concept of the subject
as socially determined lays the
theoretical groundwork for the discursively
constituted postmodern subject. Thus, although
Marx is in many ways
a thoroughly modernist thinker, there
are nevertheless elements of his
theory that prefigure postmodernism, particularly
the postmodern concept of the
subject. Another way of putting
this is that Marx opens
up what Althusser has called
a "new continent of thought"
without fully entering that continent.
That this compatibility with postmodernism
is not true of liberalism
should be evident. Liberalism is
thoroughly and, I would argue,
irredeemably modernist. Specifically, it is
antithetical to the kind of
postmodern redefinition that Mouffe is
attempting. Without the modernist concept
of the subject and its
universal principles, liberalism makes little
sense.What I am arguing, then,
is that while the marriage
of a marxist politics of
resistance and a postmodern emphasis
on difference offers fruitful possibilities
for a left politics, the
incorporation of liberalism into this
theoretical mix does not. This
thesis can best be illustrated
by examining radical plural democracy's
reception among the adherents of
one of the new social
movements it seeks to incorporate:
feminism. In Politics and Culture
Ryan devotes a chapter to
"the Politics of Deconstruction: Feminism",
arguing for a convergence between
the two approaches. But although
there has been an extensive
discussion in the feminist community
about the relevance of postmodernism
for feminism, there have been
few discussions of radical plural
democracy. Mouffe has attempted to
bring radical plural democracy and
feminism together through her concept of
citizenship:
The concept of difference has dominated discussions in feminist theory
in recent years. The central
question in this controversy is
whether feminists should emphasize or
downplay both the differences between
women and men and those
between different groups of women.
Mouffe brings the anti-essentialism of
radical plural democracy to bear
on this question by asserting
that abandoning an essentialist concept
of woman, far from being
an obstacle to the formation
of a feminist democratic project,
is instead the condition of
its possibility. She argues that
many different kinds of identification
can form around the concept
"woman" that can provide the
basis for a feminist politics (Ibid.,
381-2).In
Justice and the Politics of Difference
Iris Marion Young outlines a feminist politics that
has much affinity to radical
plural democracy. Young defines justice
as the institutionalized conditions that
make it possible for all
to learn and use satisfying
skills in socially recognized settings,
to participate in decision making
and express their feelings and
perspectives on social life in
contexts where others can listen
(91). Young rejects the definition
of justice as the transcendence
of group differences. Instead she
argues that the politics of
difference requires that participation and
inclusion for all groups sometimes
entails different treatment for oppressed
or disadvantaged groups (158). Like
the adherents of radical plural
democracy Young wants to distinguish
her approach from liberal pluralism.
The "radical democratic pluralism" that
she advances rests on the
thesis that agents should have
empowerment, not autonomy, a concept
that, for Young, involves publicity,
not privacy
(251).It is misleading to conclude
that the similarity between Young's
politics of difference and radical
plural democracy entails an endorsement
of the position by the
feminist community. Contemporary feminism is
far from monolithic; it is
impossible to identify the feminist
position on any issue. Despite
this, the similarities between Young's
position and radical plural democracy
are significant. How to deal
with the differences between women
and how to fashion a
feminist politics without "essential woman"
are key issues in contemporary
feminist theory. Young's approach, an
approach that has much in
common with radical plural democracy,
has been widely acclaimed in
the feminist community. It is
also significant that another prominent
feminist theorist, one whose philosophical
roots lie in the Habermasian
tradition, also articulates a position
that has much in common
with radical plural democracy. Nancy
Fraser argues against the thesis
that liberal democracy is the
final solution for all social
systems. Instead she argues for
a politics of "parallel discursive
arenas where members of subordinated
social groups invent and circulate
counterdiscourses" (67). What we need,
she asserts, is a critical
political sociology of a form
of public life in which
multiple but unequal publics participate
(70). Despite differences in jargon,
this comes to much the
same thing as the theories
of Mouffe and
Young.The compatibility between radical plural
democracy and some aspects of
feminism exemplifies how a resistance
movement can benefit from utilizing
the theoretical tools of postmodern
thought that these theorists advance.
Noticeably missing from the theoretical
mix in these approaches to
feminism, however, are aspects of
liberalism. The case of feminism
illustrates the futility of pursuing
the theoretical incorporation of liberalism
that Mouffe espouses. While the
feminists discussed above refer frequently
to postmodern concepts such as
the multiplicity of subjects, the
liberal notion of the autonomous
subject is completely
jettisoned. This exploration of feminism, furthermore,
also points to a problem
the theorists of radical plural
democracy have failed to deal
with successfully: politics. Feminist theory
is necessarily political; it demands
a connection to political issues
for concretely situated women. Feminist
theorists have devoted much attention
to fashioning a viable feminist
politics from the basic principles
of feminist analysis. The theorists
of radical plural democracy have
not. The approach, in effect,
has no political program. Although
references to politics are scattered
throughout the works of these
theorists, they are both intermittent
and decidedly vague. The major
stumbling block to the articulation
of a politics informed by
radical plural democracy is the
question of the identity of
the subject. Theorists of radical
plural democracy want to incorporate
the postmodern deconstruction of the
modernist subject into their approach.
But how to do so
seems to escape them. I
quoted Mouffe above as arguing
that what we need is
"the articulation of an ensemble
of subject positions...precariously sutured."
She fails to even begin
to suggest how this might be
realized.In a book devoted entirely
to the question of political
identity Laclau (The Making of Political Identities)
argues that with
the demise of the Cold
War everything is up for
grabs, especially political identity. Half
of Laclau's book is devoted
to "real politics" - the
attempt to apply radical plural
democracy to actual political issues.
But this attempt increases rather
than dispels the suspicion that
radical plural democracy has no
viable political program. The main
problem for the authors of
the articles in the book
is reconciling the identity politics
of many new social movements
with the anti-essentialist subject of
postmodernism. One of the authors,
for example, suggests that "Against
such an identitary logic, the
possibility of developing a more
democratic logic of identity construction,
one that recognizes the peculiar
logic of a 'never-sutured identity,'
will be held out" (Norval,
119). But this possibility is
only held out, never realized.
Articulating a postmodern approach to
the subject that at the
same time is capable of
political action is a difficult
theoretical task, but, I would
argue, not an insuperable one.
Those who attempt to fashion
a radical plural democratic approach
to identity, however, need to
devote much more attention to this
task. The political weaknesses of radical
plural democracy, thus, are significant,
particularly for an approach that
claims to be the salvation
of leftist politics. On the
theoretical front the story is
different. In a theoretical sense
the strengths of radical plural
democracy are identical to its
weaknesses. The approach brings together
the dominant theoretical positions of
the late twentieth century: postmodernism,
poststructuralism, language theory, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics,
even liberal democracy. It also
incorporates the new social movements
such as feminism, ecology, and
the identity politics of racial
and ethnic minorities. And it
accomplishes this without abandoning the
emancipatory impulse of marxism. This
is no mean feat. No
other position on the theoretical
horizon, left or right, has accomplished
this. But at what price has
this theoretical feat been achieved?
Is the eclecticism of radical
plural democracy an appropriate response
to the demise of metanarratives
in the postmodern world or
is it simply incoherent? Despite
my criticisms of the approach
I would like to suggest
that radical plural democracy performs
a significant theoretical function. A
sea change is occurring in
twentieth century thought, a movement
away from the absolute to
the relative, from the universal
to the particular, from the
transcendental subject to the situated
self. Radical plural democracy is
part of this change. Its
theorists attempt to incorporate the
moral force of marxism and
the insights of the movements,
both intellectual and political, that
constitute this change. In some
respects they have not succeeded
in this goal. They try
to bring too much under
their theoretical umbrella. The new
approaches to liberal democracy, in
particular, do not fit. But
I think that their attempt
is important and, in some
sense, inevitable. I believe, with
Foucault, that we are witnessing
an epistemological shift, a paradigm
change, in the late twentieth
century. This new continent of
thought demands a new approach
to politics, particularly the politics
of resistance. Radical plural democracy
has not met this demand.
But it may have begun
the process by which a
future theoretical approach will accomplish this
goal.
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Notes
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1
Mouffe uses the
phrase "radical and plural democracy."
I prefer this
wording. 2 Aronowitz's Crisis in
Historical Materialism (1981) prefaces many
of the themes of radical
plural democracy. But, unlike Laclau
and Mouffe, Aronowitz remains within
the confines of Marxist theory.
His "radical democracy" is rooted
in the Soviets of the
Russian Revolution, not postmodernism (1993).
He attempts to fit the
new social movements into Marxist
theory, not to radically restructure
it. Norberto Bobbio (1988) also
prefaces the themes of radical
plural democracy. Bobbio initiates the
discussion of the relationship between
socialism and liberal democratic theory
that Laclau and Mouffe
continue.3 In a related
redefinition of the subject from
a post-Marxist perspective Guattari and
Negri argue that communism has
nothing to do with "collective
barbarism" but, rather, is "the
most intense experience of subjectivity"
(1987:39).4 See, among others,
Connolly (1991), Hekman (1995), White
(1991), Scott (1990), Shapiro
(1992), Arac (1986), and Cornell (1991,
1992).5 Todd May (1994) goes
so far as to argue
that postmodernism entails an anarchist
politics.
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